








In this study, we offer a novel approach to research on migration reporting by focus-
ing on the argumentative substance prevalent in different online outlets. Taking
German refugee policy as our case in point we map the role that moral, ethical–
cultural, legal, and pragmatic argumentations play within journalistic, partisan, and
activist outlets; and how these coincide with incivility and impoliteness. Using
dictionary-based content analysis on a data set of 34,819 articles from thirty online
news outlets published between April 10, 2017, and April 10, 2018, we find that legacy
mainstream media, partisan media, and activist media perform vastly different functions
for the larger public sphere. We observe that human rights activist media perform an
advocatory function by making the moral case for refugees, whereas corrosive partisan
media at the fringe—particularly within the contra-refugee camp—often present
opponents as inherently illegitimate enemies. Implications for public sphere theory
and directions for future research on emerging and legacy media are discussed.
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In recent years, traditional journalism’s role in public discourse on immigration and
refugee policy in Western democracies has enjoyed increased attention within
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communication research (Eberl et al. 2018). This is due to nations’ differing reactions
during the massive refugee movement in 2015 (Berry et al. 2016). Overall, the effect of
news reporting on migration appears to favor contra-refugee positions, with portrayals
of migration focusing on the crime and potential negative effects of migration and fur-
thering stereotypical portrayals of migrants.
At the same time, legacy news outlets now compete with less professional alterna-
tive outlets for readers’ attention (Van Aelst et al. 2017). Although these alternatives
potentially offer space for dissenting views, critics warn that well-organized networks
of bad-faith actors from the right do not enrich public discourse, but rather threaten the
fabric of Western democracies by spreading disinformation (Bennett and Livingston
2018) and far-right ideologies that further marginalize minorities (Larson and
McHendry Jr. 2019).
It is, therefore, necessary to investigate the exact functions that different emerging
online outlets perform within the larger public sphere: Do they supplement mainstream
discourse with an increased dose of moral argumentation focusing on questions of
justice? Or do they primarily inject group-based ethical–cultural arguments? How
prevalent are pragmatic and legal arguments concerning the feasibility of different
courses of action in a crisis? Finally, how are the varying types of arguments related
to the level of civility and politeness and how do outlets thus promote the integration
of citizens within democratic society?
Using a multiperspectival normative assessment approach (Althaus 2012), we
deploy a systemic investigation into the contribution of a broad and differentiated
sample of outlets. Using dictionary-based content analysis on thirty outlets from the
field of German online news, we map their contributions to different forms of public
discourse and ascertain whether these contributions come at the cost of spreading
incivility.
Refugee Policy Discourse in a Diversifying Public Sphere
Previous research assessed factors that increase multiperspectiveness within main-
stream news—with media targeting elite audiences, public broadcasting and politically
pluralistic media systems favoring a broader coverage of issues, and tabloid media
offering a more one-sided, negative portrayal of migration (Benson 2013; Berry
et al. 2016; Jacobs et al. 2016; Masini et al. 2018). At the same time, mainstream cov-
erage overall appears to focus on negative aspects of migration, with crime as well as
cultural and economic disruption, gaining larger attention, strengthening negative
stereotypes and fears (Eberl et al. 2018). This might explain why media attention on
immigration alone can be sufficient to further negative attitudes towards immigrants
(van Klingeren et al. 2015) and support for antiimmigrant parties (Burscher et al. 2015).
To understand the inherent divisiveness of immigration and refugee policy dis-
course, it is helpful to see the issue as a case of what Fraser (2009) calls “abnormal
justice.” Normal justice discourse takes place within the framework of a nation-state,
with those subjected to a particular decision arguing on relatively equal footing as cit-
izens of the same polity. Potential immigrants and refugees, meanwhile, strive to make
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their case without being an accepted part of the community that makes the decision,
leading to stark asymmetries of power. And since migrants aim to become part of
the host community, the boundaries of who gets to decide—bounded by citizenship
rights—are themselves disputed (Benhabib 2002).
As Bennett and Pfetsch (2018) have noted, this abnormalization of justice and the
resulting legitimacy crises within Western democracies coincide and interact with dis-
rupted public spheres, in which a “diversification of content, voices, and audiences
shapes public communication” (p. 244). In countries like Germany with moderate
political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini 2004), where journalistic media traditionally
diverge into different political camps (Peters 2008: 91), we would already expect jour-
nalistic media coverage of refugee policy to diverge along political lines to some
degree. With the rise of alt-right online media on one hand (Kaiser et al. 2019), and
pro-refugee activists giving voice to refugees’ and migrants’ concerns not usually
heard in mainstream reporting (Gemi et al. 2013; Masini et al. 2018), traditional jour-
nalistic outlets now compete with alternative information sources by partisan actors
and activist groups (Bennett and Livingston 2018). The normative question, then, is
how democratic societies should process this abnormalization of justice and how
they should integrate the voices of diverse journalistic and partisan organizations.
Present political communication research is concerned with increased polarization
and fragmentation of media content and media use online, which many authors fear
lead to lower respect for opposing positions (Van Aelst et al. 2017). Although the back-
lash against liberal refugee policies is a normal process within the broader public
sphere and not in itself antidemocratic, decreased respect for opposing positions
does threaten liberal democracies’ ability to process conflicts democratically
(Alexander 2019). This corrosive potential should motivate communication research-
ers to assess precisely how the conflicts between diverging political camps are enacted
within online outlets.
Four Types of Arguments in Public Discourse
and Their Democratic Functions
Preventing the disintegration of democratic society into incompatible camps, which
view each other not as legitimate democratic opponents but as enemies who must be
fought through violence, is a core concern of most democratic theories. This
concern has two empirical components: First, how civil or uncivil is the exchange
between the opposing camps, and second, what types of argumentative resources are
mustered by the opponents to support their claims? Although recent communication
research has extensively focused on (in)civility (see, e.g., Boatright et al. 2019), the
types of arguments used in public discourse have rarely been scrutinized in depth
(but see Peters et al. 2008a: 153–59, 2008b).
Following Habermas (1996), we distinguish four types of argument particularly rel-
evant for migration discourse. These argument types correspond to different functions
of public discourse, with different theoretical traditions emphasizing or de-emphasizing
particular functions.
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Arguments regarding the efficiency and feasibility of policies are part of pragmatic
discourses (Habermas 1996: 159–60): When we talk about what means best achieve
agreed-upon ends when we weigh the aptness of policies and their positive and nega-
tive outcomes, we make pragmatic arguments. When everyone agrees on the goals of
policies, pragmatic discourses suffice. Assessing the pragmatic feasibility of policies
can therefore be considered the pragmatic function of public discourse. Liberal theo-
rists fear that if political discourse strays from pragmatic discourse there is a danger
of vilifying one’s opponents. To avoid this danger, liberal theorists argue for what
Ackerman (1989) calls “conversational restraint”: When citizens find causes for
deep moral disagreement, they should “simply say nothing at all about this disagree-
ment and put the moral ideals that divide us off the conversational agenda of the
liberal state” (Ackerman 1989: 16).
But often citizens and their representatives disagree about goals, based on diverging
values. If we try to convince people belonging to the same political group as we do, or
people sharing our cultural values, we enter ethical–cultural discourses. For example,
if actors invoke Christian values, German interests or worker solidarity, they argue
from a shared identity, and arguments that rest on such values will be convincing
only to people who share this identity (Habermas 1996: 160–61). Agonistic democrats
emphasize this function. Mouffe (2013: 7–9) argues that the core of democratic politics
is to motivate voters through offering starkly different political alternatives to not leave
the field open to fundamentalist and extremist antidemocratic and illiberal parties
which are able to appeal to primordial group identities (Mouffe 2000: 113–16).
Backlash against progressive policies, especially liberal immigration policies, often
takes an agonistic, cultural–ethical form (Alexander 2019). Analogously, pro-immigration
activists may emphasize their identity as members of both the host community and as
immigrants, or they may form an identity around their marginalized status (Glover
2011). This contestatory appeal to ethical–cultural identities can therefore be understood
as the agonistic function of public discourse.
But in a pluralistic democracy, we do not always agree on cultural values.
Therefore, Habermas (1996: 161–62) argues that citizens should engage in moral
discourses—aiming to find universal principles of justice that are legitimate across cul-
tural contexts. Human rights and civil rights are commonly understood as expressions
of such universal principles, and arguments for justice and nondiscrimination also
appeal to universal, rather than culture-specific values (Young 2000: 112–15). For
Habermas, most societal conflicts must be translated into moral discourses in order
to be properly understood and resolved, since pragmatic concerns and ethical–cultural
values alone cannot motivate agreement across different groups. Therefore, delibera-
tive democrats argue for a focus on moral discourse (Habermas 1996: 168).
Marginalized groups often have no power but the power of moral argument to repre-
sent their interests (Habermas 1994: 140–42; Huspek 2007). This pertains especially to
refugees who can only appeal to the morally bonding force of universal human rights to
make their case. Therefore, deliberative democrats emphasize the moral-deliberative
function within public discourse. Admitting moral argument into the public arena
might make politics more controversial, but, from the deliberative perspective,
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constitutes a necessary condition for processing deep disagreements (Gutmann and
Thompson 2004).
Lastly, since democratic states follow the rule of law, the legality of policies must be
evaluated, and moral discourses must be translated into legal discourses to be socially
effective (Habermas 1996: 168). This is also important since political groups often
appeal to existing laws—for example, debating the issue of legal and illegal forms
of migration. We consider this linking of other discourses with legal questions the
legal-evaluative function of public discourse.
Fostering Respect—Civility and Politeness
In the previous section, we argued that different democratic traditions emphasize dif-
ferent functions of public discourse that are manifested in different types of argument.
We argue that this disagreement is rooted in possible trade-offs between the moral-
deliberative and agonistic functions of public discourses on the one hand and the inte-
grative function of public discourses on the other: Public discourses should not just
allow an exchange of opinions and a demarcation of positions and identities but
should foster respect for opposing positions.
This integrative function can take two forms (Papacharissi 2004; Rossini 2020):
Politeness, that is, showing interpersonal respect between actors by avoiding
insulting language and accusations of lying, can make opponents more open for
diverging ideas and allow participants to accept policy outcomes even if they do
not agree with them. Civility, meanwhile, is concerned not with interpersonal
respect, but with accepting the democratic legitimacy of your opponent. As an
example of public-level incivility, Peters (2008: 104–05) referred to the strategy
of calling your opponent totalitarian, fascist, or communist to delegitimize them
or accusing them of being irrational: This is not just impolite, it aims at fundamen-
tally delegitimizing the accused and excluding them from democratic discourse
(Mouffe 2013; Peters 2008: 59–61). Opponents who are not just impolite, but
uncivil, therefore no longer see each other as opponents that can process their dis-
agreement with democratic means.
Liberal democrats, as previously argued, fear that there is a trade-off between
moral-deliberative and agonistic functions on one hand and the integrative function,
and therefore argue for focusing on the pragmatic and legal-evaluative functions of
public discourse: “The hope is that, by this method of avoidance, as we might call
it, existing differences between contending political views can at least be moderated,
even if not entirely removed, so that social cooperation on the basis of mutual
respect can be maintained” (Rawls 1985: 231).
Deliberative democrats, meanwhile, argue that we should “open up the political
agenda to more moral disagreement than liberal theorists usually allow” (Gutmann
and Thompson 2004: 65), to process moral disagreement rather than bracket it from
public concern. Although they would allow for the moderate trade-off between impo-
liteness and the moral-deliberative function (Estlund 2008: 186–201), this should not
lead to incivility.
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Agonistic theorists, lastly, argue that the integrative function of public spheres can
be best performed by focusing on the agonistic function of public discourse. This strug-
gle is not necessarily polite; in fact, impolite language can be a valuable rhetorical tool
to appeal to citizens’ passions (Papacharissi 2004; Young 2000: 63–70). However,
confrontation should foster “agonistic respect”: Through contestatory engagement
political camps learn to see opposing political groups not as enemies, but as adversaries
that struggle within a shared democratic arena (Mouffe 2013: 5–9), maintaining civility
(but not necessarily politeness) and therefore furthering the integrative function.
By defining the wider democratic functions of different forms of arguments, we are
able to assess the performance of outlets on the basis of both the arguments they focus
on and the more or less polite and civil form of their public speech. The relationship
between the democratic functions we identified and how they manifest within these
outlets is summarized in Table 1. The empirical study described below thus goes
beyond extant research by directly drawing on categories and traditions of normative
reasoning still often neglected in empirical political communication research. Through
this, the empirical results obtained can then also be used for the ensuing normative




To compare German media discourses on refugee policy within different types of
online outlets, we scraped the RSS (Really Simple Syndication) feeds of thirty
online outlets over a period of one year, starting on April 10, 2017 and ending on
April 10, 2018.
Our goal was to capture a broad spectrum of outlets that represent both the coverage
of mainstream journalistic outlets as well as partisan and activist media that contributed
to the mediated debate about refugee policy. To do so, we expand on our own previous
research about public groups on Facebook that discussed the issue (Freudenthaler
2020) where we found different pro- and contra-refugee camps. We also build on
extant research about alternative media linked to the far-right populist party
AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) (Bachl 2018). In studying these outlets, it turns
Table 1. Argument Types, Incivility, Impoliteness, and their Democratic Function.
Function Manifests in
Pragmatic function Pragmatic arguments
Agonistic function Ethical–cultural arguments
Moral-deliberative function Moral arguments based on universal principles
Legal-evaluative function Legal arguments
Integrative function Absence of uncivil and impolite language
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out that both pro- and contra-refugee groups cite legacy news media outlets and supple-
ment their content with partisan or activist reporting sympathetic to their respective views.
The rationale for including the outlets in each category is described in greater detail in
Section A of the Supplemental Information file—we used public data on the number of
website visits, counts of social media likes and shares, and the data analyzed in
Freudenthaler (2020).
To assess the performance of journalistic legacy media, we included the largest
online tabloid outlets (Bild, t-online) and online versions of national quality news
outlets (Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ ), Focus, Spiegel,
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit, and Tagesschau). We also included regional online
media outlets representative of large markets in East and West Germany (Der
Westen and Tag24) and the largest online news outlets from Berlin, Munich, and
Leipzig (Tagesspiegel, Merkur, and Leipziger Volkszeitung (LVZ )).
Among contra-refugee groups online, we found that mainstream media were supple-
mented by legacy media with a strong partisan bent (Junge Freiheit) and online-only
outlets ranging from conservative (Achse des Guten, Tichy’s Einblick) to far-right
(Compact Online, Contra Magazin, Ein Prozent Blog, PI-News). Additionally, contra-
refugee groups cited journalistic outlets with foreign national ties (Epoch Online,
Russia Today) and Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten, an outlet with no clear partisan
orientation but a tendency to spread scandalizing news and disinformation. These obser-
vations are in line with extant research that suggests populist right-wing actors within
Germany can draw on a distinct alternative media sphere (Bachl 2018).
Among the pro-refugee groups, we also found different types of outlets: Some of
them are established partisan news outlets (the left-leaning Tageszeitung (taz) and
the socialist Neues Deutschland). Others belong to activist group outlets (human
rights organizations: Pro Asyl, Amnesty International and Sea Watch, and within
far-left groups, activists like Klasse gegen Klasse).
Assessing such a comprehensive set of diverse types of outlets allows us to assess
the functions that legacy media as well as partisan and activist media perform within
the German online public sphere while at the same time going beyond the mere
description of their prevalence (Bachl 2018).
We downloaded 1,001,719 articles from the thirty outlets across the entire sampling
period. We only included articles that cover refugee policy and chose those articles by
using keywords related to refugee or migration policy.1 The search terms were manu-
ally validated. We found that articles that mentioned at least two of the keywords, with
the distance between those keywords covering at least a quarter of the overall length of
the article, covered refugee or migration policy as their main topic. This selection cri-
terion led to a final sample of 34,819 articles. All articles where then cleaned up of html
code as well as page elements like comments and links to related articles before they
were subjected to the dictionary-based content analysis.
To measure whether statements contained in the articles sampled referred to prag-
matic, ethical–cultural, moral, or legal standards, we first manually coded these four cat-
egories on a sub-sample of 1,172 articles from twelve outlets as reference coding for the
ensuing dictionary-based analysis. Two coders, one researcher and one student recruited
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from our university’s communication program, after in-depth training with the codebook,
each coded a random subsample of half of the articles, stratified over the twelve outlets,
with a subsample of 120 articles (10 percent of the sample) being coded by both coders to
measure intercoder reliability (Neuendorf 2017: 187).We decided tomeasure the number
of occurrences for each argument type on the article level.
For the main argument categories we expanded on the operationalization of previ-
ous research (Mitman et al. 2012) into moral, ethical–cultural, legal, and pragmatic
argumentation within news outlets. Pragmatic arguments were coded when statements
mentioned costs or utility, practical or political chances for realizing a solution (e.g.,
“realistic,” “pragmatic,” “impossible”) or positive or negative effects of a policy.
Ethical–cultural arguments were manually coded when a statement contained an
appeal to group-based unity or a bemoaning of division, an appeal to cultural values
or traditions or to group interests. For moral arguments, manual coders were instructed
to code statements referring to civil or human rights or international law, to nondis-
crimination or the equal treatment of people or human dignity. Legal arguments
were counted when statements referred to the (il)legality of migration or policies
related to migration or when they called people criminal.
Additionally, from previous research on migration news and a qualitative assess-
ment of our sample we found that two types of argument were particularly salient
and should thus be added as relevant content categories: Morally outrageous crimes,
as a specific type of moral argumentation that played a special role in immigration
reporting (Burscher et al. 2015), so we also coded as “crime” any mention of crimes
that violate human rights (e.g., sexual assaults, murder, and torture) in order not to
miss important parts of the moralizing language. And since catastrophic language—
an extreme variation of pragmatic concerns—plays both an important role in main-
stream reporting on migration (El Refaie 2001) and warning of “floods” of migrants
or migration leading to civil war are common tropes within far-right discourse, we
coded catastrophic effects when statements mentioned society falling apart, invasions,
civil war, dramatic effects, catastrophes, or comparisons with natural disasters.
Impoliteness and incivility were coded independently from the other coding catego-
ries and from each other, as early codebook tests showed that coders confounded var-
iables when they were advised to code argument type variables and incivility/
impoliteness in one go. One pair of coders (one researcher and one student) coded a
random subsample of half of all articles each, with a subsample of 120 articles (10
percent of the sample) being coded by both coders to measure intercoder reliability
(Neuendorf 2017: 187) for incivility; for impoliteness, the sample was split over
three coders (two students and one researcher), again using a subsample of 120 articles
to assess intercoder reliability.
Impoliteness is understood here as disrespect directed at others, expressed through
name-calling, accusing others of lying, or vulgarity. Coders were advised to code as
impolite all verbal abuse, insults, vulgar language, insulting nicknames, and all syno-
nyms for liar or lying.
As a measure for incivility, we were interested in the varying ways in which actors
were delegitimized from participating in the democratic public. Coders classified as
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uncivil: calls for removing people’s rights and calls for removing democratic institu-
tions (following the operationalization of Papacharissi 2004), accusations of an
unsound mind (“insane,” “hysterical,” etc.), accusations of propaganda, conspiracy,
foreign control, or infiltration; accusations of being a bigot or antidemocratic, that is,
when individual people or groups were described as extremists or despots (e.g., “total-
itarian”), or when they were called ideologues/demagogues. All codebooks can be
found in Section B of Supplemental Information file.
After acquiring human coded reference data, we used dictionary-based automated
coding—in some cases supplemented by search-string based sentence coding—to
analyze the whole sample. The dictionaries were created by surveying a list of the
15,000 most prominent words in our sample, excluding stopwords, for terms associ-
ated with our categories, following Muddiman et al. (2019). We manually chose dic-
tionary terms without statistical evaluation at that stage but did use keyword-in-context
search to check the face validity of coded terms within their sentences. The German
dictionary Duden was used to supplement synonyms for dictionary terms we selected.
Dictionary reliability was then tested against the human coded reference data, compar-
ing the number of human coded occurrences of each category with the number of terms
coded by our dictionary at the article level. For a description of the dictionaries see
Section C of the Supplemental Information file.
Table 2 contains reliability scores both for our manual reference coding and for the
dictionaries we created. All categories achieved a Krippendorff’s α of >0.66, showing
that our codings are well suited for a descriptive overview of our sample. For moral
arguments, catastrophic effects, pragmatic arguments, and incivility our dictionaries
proved to be very reliable, with a Krippendorff’s α >0.8, while ethical–cultural and
legal arguments were the hardest to measure, with α values of 0.70. We applied the
dictionaries to all 34,819 texts of our sample of thirty online outlets. We also standar-
dized our results against the overall word count of each article—otherwise, differences
Table 2. Reliability for Human Coders and Dictionaries.
Intercoder Reliability
Reliability between Human Coders
and Dictionary-Based Results
Spearman’s ρ Krippendorff’s α Spearman’s ρ Krippendorff’s α
Pragmatic 0.87 0.76 0.83 0.81
Ethical–cultural 0.75 0.85 0.56 0.70
Moral 0.79 0.95 0.78 0.89
Legal 0.73 0.72 0.66 0.70
Crime 0.74 0.81 0.71 0.72
Catastrophe 0.77 0.84 0.75 0.82
Impoliteness 0.71 0.84 0.68 0.76
Incivility 0.86 0.92 0.77 0.86
Note. Reliability scores are reported using both Spearman’s ρ and Krippendorff’s α, following Neuendorff
(2017).
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in the measured occurrence of the dictionary terms might just reflect differences in
article-length between outlets. Table 3, therefore, shows occurrences of dictionary
terms per 1,000 words.
Results
To assess the discursive profile of different outlets, we compare the occurrence of
ethical–cultural, moral, legal, and pragmatic arguments, mentions of crime and catas-
trophe as well as incivility and impoliteness as the average occurrence of dictionary
terms per 1,000 words on the article level (Table 3).
We then performed a principal component analysis on these data to assess how our
variables relate to one another. This allows us to visualize in a two-dimensional space
how the outlets perform on the seven variables measured. The resulting dimensions
describe 39 and 27.9 percent of the variation on our underlying variables. Within
Figure 1, therefore, arrows indicate the direction of underlying variables: The closer
two-dimensional arrows are, the higher the underlying variables correlate. The
closer outlets are to an arrow’s tip, the larger their value on that dimension.
We further used hierarchical cluster analysis to assess which outlets are similar in
their content profile. Using the Euclidian distance as our dissimilarity measure and
Ward’s method, we found that the outlets fell into four main clusters (for the elbow
test and dendrogram see Section D of the Supplemental Information file). The
results of both analyses are visualized in Figure 1.
Partisan and Activist Media
The first cluster we found within our sample is characterized by high volumes of both
ethical arguments and incivility and impoliteness. Among the right-wing outlets (Achse
des Guten, Compact, Ein Prozent, PINews, and Tichys Einblick), cultural values are
invoked to present German culture as under threat and to draw a boundary against
both cultural foreigners and politicians who do not share right-wing values. Political
opponents are consistently compared to dictators in order to portray every policy
that does not conform to the far-right as illegitimate, and to tie that threat to a perceived
assault on an alleged homogeneous German culture. The threat of immigration is pre-
sented as apocalyptic—cultural heterogeneity is presented as leading to civil war and
invasion by a homogeneous Muslim culture. Interestingly, the far-left pro-refugee
outlet Klasse gegen Klasse mirrors these discourses in a similarly high share of incivil-
ity and impoliteness, and a focus on both ethical–cultural arguments and moral dis-
course. They counter the far-right arguments for cultural homogeneity with calls for
a working-class identity that includes refugees. At the same time, they also mirror
the far-right’s antipluralism, by presenting moderate, and even left-wing politicians
who are critical of unregulated immigration as reactionary and racist, leaving little
room for legitimate democratic dissent.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Human Rights Organizations and a Right-wing Response
Cluster 2 contains two out of three Human rights organizations within our cluster
(ProAsyl and Seawatch). These organizations focus on the humanitarian concerns
guiding refugee policy, making a legal case for refugee rights, and highlighting prag-
matic and what they consider catastrophic effects of refugee policies. Two of those
outlets also emphasize catastrophic conditions within refugee camps to present
further migration to the West as the only humane alternative (Table 3). At the same
time, human rights groups avoid incivility and impoliteness: Opponents of a welcom-
ing refugee policy are mostly treated with respect despite substantial disagreements.
These outlets present the strongest case against Ackerman’s (1989) argument for com-
municative restraint: They are able to provide morally contested arguments without
resorting to delegitimizing their opponents as enemies. Again, we find one outlier
within this cluster: The far-right Contra Magazin mirrors human rights organizations’
focus on legal and pragmatic discourses (Table 3) as well as low incivility and impo-
liteness while at the same time countering the human-rights narrative by emphasizing
what they consider the catastrophic effects of taking in refugees. Amnesty
International, lastly, is in its own cluster since it combines the features of other
human rights organizations with a larger focus on crime: Due to their international
focus, the crimes committed against refugees make up a larger share of their output.
This leads to Amnesty International seemingly being close to the center of Figure 1,
despite having the largest volume of moral arguments within their output (Table 3).
Mainstream Media and Alternative Journalistic Outlets
Within the last cluster, we find both legacy media and outlets we considered alternative
news outlets. Compared to partisan media and activist outlets in the other clusters,
these outlets are comparatively similar: They contain a lower share of moral and
ethical arguments, mention catastrophic effects less often and display little incivility
and impoliteness. Thus, one could argue they all, generally, follow the standard of
detached reporting and would probably be viewed as journalistic outlets by readers.
Still, we were interested if the variance within this large cluster could be analyzed
further. To do so, we conducted a principal component analysis only considering
outlets from this cluster. Here, the resulting dimensions explain 36.9 and 27.5 percent
of the variation on our underlying variables. We again used hierarchical cluster analysis
to assess which outlets are similar in their content profile, finding that the remaining
outlets again fell into four main clusters. The results are visualized in Figure 2.
Mainstream Outlets
Next, we observe that the largest cluster (Figure 2) contains all legacy media of both
regional and national news outlets. It appears that mainstream media differ from all
other clusters in their lower share of moral, ethical, legal, and even pragmatic argu-
ments and lower incivility and impoliteness. At the same time, we find one interesting
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pattern within this cluster: The traditionally more left-leaning outlets Zeit and
Sueddeutsche show a slightly increased share of moral and ethical-cultural arguments,
respectively, while the more conservative outlets Welt and FAZ show a slightly
increased share of pragmatic and legal arguments—suggesting that the political lean-
ings of newspapers weakly influence the prevalence of argument types within their
reporting.
Tabloid Media
The smallest cluster within the journalistic outlets is made up of tag24 and bild.de,
which diverge from mainstream news coverage mainly in their larger focus on
crime. Since bild.de is the online version of Germany’s largest tabloid, and tag24 is
a regional outlet that seems to mirror bild.de in style (even copying the online tabloid’s
layout), we can interpret this as a result of tabloid reporting’s focus on scandalization
(Lawlor 2015).
Figure 1. Mapping argument types, incivility, and impoliteness over all outlets. Principal
component analysis of argument type and incivility/impoliteness variables. Arrows indicate the
direction of individual variables; outlet position indicates their profile over all variables. Color of
outlets is determined by hierarchical cluster analysis.
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Fringe Mainstream Media
The third cluster within the journalistic outlets (see Figure 2) contains legacy media of
outlets that have somewhat established themselves within the German journalistic
mainstream while having ties to either the left or the right fringe. TAZ, an originally
left-wing alternative news outlet that today is considered left-liberal, and Neues
Deutschland, a newspaper with financial ties to the Left Party, differ from mainstream
reporting by a larger focus on moral arguments and slightly larger shares of incivility
and impoliteness. Junge Freiheit, a conservative outlet with right-wing populist lean-
ings, also falls into this cluster, with a higher share of ethical–cultural and moral argu-
ments and similarly increased shares of incivility and impoliteness. These results
suggest that the three fringe outlets function as a link between mainstream journalism
and far-right and far-left actors—maintaining a journalistic style similar to professional
news outlets, but with a slightly increased focus on ethical–cultural and moral argu-
ments favored by the political fringes, and with slightly increased levels of incivility
and impoliteness.
Figure 2. Mapping argument types, incivility, and impoliteness over journalistic outlets.
Principal component analysis of argument type and incivility/impoliteness variables. Arrows
indicate the direction of individual variables; outlet position indicates their profile over all
variables. Color of outlets is determined by hierarchical cluster analysis.
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Destabilizing Media
Lastly, and interestingly, cluster 4 within Figure 2 contains Russia Today, Epoch
Times, and Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten. These media play a prominent role
within right-wing populist media spheres (Bachl 2018), but we find that they interest-
ingly do not diverge much from mainstream reporting. In fact, during the coding
process we observed that these outlets contain a lot of content adopted from main-
stream news agencies. Future research, therefore, should consider the possibility that
these pages water down questionable reporting by integrating it into traditional
factual news, which might serve to legitimize these outlets in the eyes of potential
readers. At the same time, these outlets differ from mainstream reporting due to
their larger focus on legality and a larger share of catastrophic effects (Table 3)—
citing both fears of catastrophic effects of migration, but also reports of catastrophic
conditions within refugee camps. This might indicate a strategy of opportunistically
feeding general societal dissatisfaction—which is consistent with previous research
into Russia Today’s editorial strategy (Elswah and Howard 2020; Yablokov 2015).
Discussion
In this study, our aim was to assess the performance of legacy and emerging online
outlets under conditions of both an abnormalization of political discourses and increas-
ing diversification of journalistic, partisan, and activist media within the online public
sphere. With populist right-wing alternative media (Bachl 2018; Heiss and Matthes
2020) and left-wing activist media working alongside traditional news outlets, critics
fear the disintegrative potential of a growing “disinformation order” (Bennett and
Livingston 2018). At the same time, both promotion of and backlash against progres-
sive policies are normal features of a democratic society. What should worry us is not
the expansion of spaces of public contestation, but whether these discourses are con-
ducted “in such a manner that enemies become frenemies, that sharp antagonism is
moderated and agonism thrives” (Alexander 2019: 6).
By focusing on what types of arguments are promoted within different information
sources, and whether they maintain civility and politeness, we assess the functions that
particular groups of outlets serve within the broader public sphere. Liberal theorists
argue that these actors best focus on the pragmatic- and legal-evaluative function of
public discourses and otherwise practice conversational restraint in order not to
threaten the integrative function through incivility and impoliteness. Deliberative dem-
ocrats, meanwhile, argue that public debate can also perform a moral-deliberative
function without contradicting the integrative function. Agonistic democrats, in turn,
argue that by strengthening group-identities, alternative media should perform an ago-
nistic function while at least maintaining civility so that the integrative function is not
threatened.
Against the backdrop of these normative expectations it is interesting to note that the
traditional and alternative media outlets we observed in this case study appear to serve
vastly different functions that play to competing normative ideals, and that our
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observed variables allowed us to map diverging outlet types by exactly the functions
they perform.
We find that within the journalistic field, legacy media appear to practice conversa-
tional restraint, concentrating on the integrative function of public discourse by main-
taining low levels of incivility.Mainstream journalism appears to be supplemented by
established fringe mainstream outlets with slightly increased incivility as well as moral
and ethical–cultural argumentation.
The question, then, is whether activist and partisan media supplement this internally
differentiated mainstream by outperforming them on the moral-deliberative and ago-
nistic functions.
It is striking that in our case study we did not find instances of ideal-typical agonistic
group-based alternative media, that is, media that focus on ethical–cultural argumen-
tation while at the same time maintaining agonistic respect, which has been observed in
activist forums under different circumstances (Milioni 2009), Instead, the partisan
outlets that did concentrate on ethical–cultural, group-based argumentation also exhib-
ited high levels of incivility. This was true for one of the observed activist outlets rep-
resentative of the far-left (Klasse gegen Klasse), but mainly for partisan outlets from
the contra-refugee camp. As Uldam and Askanius (2013) have noted, civility can be
contested within activist spaces, and political identities can also form around a
common identity that is decidedly antipluralist: By portraying opponents as illegiti-
mate, far-right and far-left groups strive to mobilize supporters for their causes.
However, instead of turning political antagonism into agonistic relations of respect
within a shared democratic framework (Mouffe 2013), such movements undermine
the democratic consensus, which is why we wish to call them corrosive partisan
media. Our results, therefore, are in line with other research that tentatively warns of
the potentially detrimental roles that hyper-partisan media play within the larger
public sphere (Boberg et al. 2020; Heiss and Matthes 2020). Although a focus on cul-
tural values and opposition to liberal refugee policies is a normal feature within a dem-
ocratic society, it is the organized disruption and spread of delegitimizing language
within these networks that risks corroding healthy democratic contestation.
Finally, in our case study we did find advocatory activist media which maintain
high levels of civility and simultaneously concentrate on arguing based on universal
human rights and standards of justice, thus supplementing both the moral-deliberative
and integrative functions of mainstream outlets—a feature previously only explored
within traditional news media (Mitman et al. 2012). Interestingly, by focusing on
legal arguments and the efficiency of refugee policies, they also strengthen the legal-
evaluative and pragmatic functions of the public sphere at large. The presence of advo-
catory activist media can be explained by the lack of direct access to the publicity that
marginalized groups (such as refugees) themselves enjoy in the German public sphere
(Berry et al. 2016). Their focus, therefore, is less on mobilizing migrants, but instead,
on influencing opinion-formation among Germans. In doing so they largely follow
deliberative standards of moral argumentation and low incivility and impoliteness,
not the agonistic ideals associated with self-mobilizing media.
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Conclusion
Our focus on the substantive focus of discourses allows us to point out normatively
positive and negative contributions of different online outlets: While some might mobi-
lize marginalized actors (agonistic alternative media) or allow for the introduction of
moral arguments into the broader public sphere (advocatory activist media), we
should be careful not to underestimate potential negative effects that corrosive partisan
media can have (Bennett and Livingston 2018).
In this paper, we have focused on the general character of pragmatic, ethical–
cultural, moral, and legal argument. Our identification of advocatory activist and
corrosive partisan media based on these argument types, as theoretically important
as they are, might be somewhat specific to the case we have studied. A more general-
izing approach in assessing emerging online media seems therefore warranted.
Similarly, our focus on German online outlets opens avenues for comparison with
other countries where the interplay between polarizing camps of media actors and the
mainstream might look different. As we noted, the absence of migrant-based agonistic
alternative media in the German case might be due to the lack of access opportunities
for migrants in this country. Future research should thus investigate migrant outlets in
terms of their argument types and impoliteness/incivility to assess their unique contri-
bution to refugee policy discourses.
Finally, the investigation of incivility and impoliteness in public discourse could
be made more fine-grained. Our measurement tools did not distinguish against whom
the uncivil and impolite statements were directed. Our results can therefore be sup-
plemented by qualitative research that investigates how exactly particular groups are
constructed as illegitimate enemies within different outlets and online spaces
(Freudenthaler 2020).
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